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The objective of IFPRI's multicountry research program on rural financial
policies for food security of the poor is to identify policies and institutional
arrangements that help the poor integrate themselves into sustainable savings and
credit systems such that they have an increased capacity to invest, bear risk, and
smooth consumption. The focus of the research on policy and program design and
their effects on household investment and consumption requires field data collection
at the institutional and household level.  This paper presents the underlying conceptual
framework and various methodological approaches that have been reviewed and
tested by the team at IFPRI and at collaborating institutions.  Methodologies are
presented for analysis at the institutional level, mainly focusing on the determinants of
the formation of financial institutions and the analysis of effects of program design on
institutional conduct and performance, and at the household level, thereby addressing
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the paper is to take stock of the development of methodologies
under the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) multicountry
research program (MP5) on “Rural Financial Policies for Household Food Security
for the Poor” (Zeller et al. 1994a).
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents an overview of MP5. 
The first part of Section 2 highlights the major policy questions asked, and describes
the conceptual framework used and the resulting main research tasks and questions. 
As the research program also uses data from country studies that have been
implemented before the commencement of the MP, the structure and content of the
data are not congruent across all nine country cases.  The second part of Section 2
gives a brief overview of the evolution of this MP, and highlights major differences in
the data that make it necessary for earlier country cases to employ somewhat less
preferred methodological approaches for addressing the set of common research
issues.  In Section 3, the main methodologies for analysis within the scope of the
multicountry project are given.  The first section presents methodologies for an
analysis of research questions at the institutional level, while the latter sector focuses
on the household level.2
2.  OVERVIEW OF MP5
OBJECTIVE, POLICY QUESTIONS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK,
AND RESEARCH TASKS
Objective
The objective of MP5 is to contribute to the identification of policies and
institutional arrangements that help to integrate the rural poor into sustainable savings
and credit systems. This integration is not only expected to improve income levels,
but also to stabilize the consumption of food and basic nonfood items by poor
households.
Policy Questions
Policy instruments for improving food security are manifold.  Given the
determinants of household food security, these can be systematized into policies that
aim to (1) increase the household's income; (2) stabilize or lower food prices; or (3)
improve the household's access to intertemporal markets.
The first two policy sets are geared towards increasing household's income and
purchasing power—either in particular seasons or years or as part of long-term
strategies.  Key policy instruments for achieving long-term food security are the
transfer of technology and investments in agriculture and infrastructure, combined
with extension and research.  Such policies are key components of any development
strategy.  Policies to directly address problems of income and purchasing power
during specific periods are the stabilization of key commodity prices and targeted
interventions, such as income transfers, food subsidies, or public works projects.
This multicountry program addresses the third set of policies, that is, to
investigate costs and benefits of policy options that potentially enhance the
household's ability to intertemporally smooth consumption and investment by3
improving the access of poor households to savings and credit services.  In contrast to
the policies stated above, the immediate goal is not to directly influence the
household's income in a particular period, but to enable households to make more
cost-efficient intertemporal adjustments of disposable income.
The project addresses the following policy questions:
! What is the scope for enhanced access and participation of the poor
in formal and informal credit and savings arrangements?
! How can the direct and indirect effects of access to credit and
savings schemes on poor household's income, consumption, and
nutrition be improved?
! How can formal financial institutions for the poor be improved, and
can formal institutions be linked with informal savings and credit
systems to create a sustainable rural financial system?
These questions attempt to identify policies and design features for financial
schemes that respond to the demand of poor households for financial services and that
provide for sustainable linkages with existing informal systems.
Conceptual Framework
This multicountry research program aims at analyzing the relationship between
food security of the rural poor and access—or the lack thereof—to financial services. 
The research involves two levels of analysis:  households and financial institutions.
At the institutional level, the research program focuses on the structure,
conduct, and performance of financial institutions that provide financial services at the
retail level to smallholders and other poor rural households. 4
At the household level, the research program analyzes the determinants of
access to and participation in financial markets.  It further aims to quantify benefits of
access on household income, consumption, nutrition, and welfare.  Finally, by
combining institutional- and household-level analysis, costs of supply of financial
services and benefits from such services at the household level are being compared to
arrive at an economic cost-benefit-criterion of public investments in financial
institutions for the poor.
An overview of the conceptual framework is given in Figure 1.  Exogenous
factors in this framework include shocks, agroecological and socioeconomic
conditions, and the macroeconomic and sectoral policies.  These factors shape
institutional arrangements in financial markets.  It is hypothesized that the formation
of formal and informal financial institutions, and their structure, conduct and
performance, is partly determined by the agroecological and socioeconomic
conditions at national, regional, and community levels.  These conditions include the
climate; the availability, quality, and distribution of land; the state of infrastructure
and technology; the population density; the level of urbanization; and the availability
and skills of the labor force.  Furthermore, macroeconomic and sectoral policies
determine the level of prices, wages, and formal interest rates in the banking sector. 
These prices—conditioned by community and household characteristics—in turn
affect the demand for savings and credit services and the costs of supply of such
services at the retail level.
Specific policies within the financial sector define the regulatory framework
under which formal financial institutions at the retail level can develop and conduct 5
Figure 1—Access to financial services and its effects on household food security
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their business.  However, the socioeconomic and agroecological conditions as well as
the macro and sector policies are expected to influence the structure, conduct, and
performance not only of formal financial institutions, but also of informal financial
institutions, including households acting as lenders or moneykeepers.
In order to increase the efficiency of the financial sector, and to address the
perceived problems of access, in particular, by rural smallholders, various policy
options exist to reduce transaction costs and risks in financial markets (Bhatt 1988;
Huppi and Feder 1990).  These include
! policies of financial market liberalization, such as elimination of
interest ceilings and direct sectoral credit allocations;
! government guarantees for savings deposits or loans in cooperatives
and rural banks;
! flexible regulatory framework to allow for region- and community-
specific adaptations of financial services;
! public investment in financial pilot schemes, in extension services
for banking by the poor, in providing institutional linkages between
community groups and the formal sector, and in covering the initial
fixed cost of acquiring, adapting, or extending financial technology
such as group-based programs; and, 
! other public investments in hard and soft infrastructure to increase
information flow and reduce transaction costs.
Such policies affect the formation, structure, conduct, and performance of the
rural financial institutions, including informal institutions at the community level. 
The policy questions outlined above lead the overall research task to evaluate public
investments in innovative, member-based financial institutions at the retail level (such7
as village banks, group-based lending, and cooperatives) by quantifying their benefits
at the household level and comparing those with the economic costs of public
investments in financial institutions.
Framework for Institutional Analysis
For the institutional analysis, the conceptual framework basically follows the
theoretical work by Williamson (1985), Bardhan (1989), Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), and
Besley and Coate (1995).  Three major constraints to the formation of financial
institutions have been identified:  information asymmetries between market partners,
lack of suitable collateral, and high transaction costs as a result.  The research will
analyze how various forms of contractual arrangements in financial institutions at the
community level circumvent or ease these constraints.
According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), imperfect information of the lender
concerning the ability and willingness of potential borrowers to repay the loan
basically leads to three problems:
! Screening.  Borrowers differ in the likelihood that they will default,
and it is costly for the lender to determine the default risk of each
borrower.  There exist "information asymmetries" between
borrower and lender as the borrower knows his probability of
default while the lender does not.
! Incentive.  It is costly to ensure that borrowers take those actions
that make repayment more likely.
! Enforcement.  It is difficult to compel repayment.
It is hypothesized that it is the market's responses to these three problems that
explain many of the observed features of rural credit markets, and that they must8
      There already exists an extensive literature on interlinked contracts; see, for
1
example, Bardhan (1989), Bell (1988), Bhaduri (1977), Esguerra and Meyer (1992),
Mitra (1983), and Kotwal (1985).
therefore guide the policies and institutional innovations.  Similar problems exist for
insurers and for savers who are entrusting their funds to a third party.
Lenders attempt to overcome these problems by demanding collateral, which
they can seize in case of loan default (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986).  Because
the rural poor lack such collateral, informal lenders use collateral substitutes, such as 
! tied contracts (specific credit cum labor, cum land, or cum
marketing arrangements in which the lender gains control over part
of the output or the production resources of the borrower) ;
1
! third-party guarantees;
! threat of loss of access to future borrowing opportunities; and,
! social sanctions of household members, extended family, informal
groups, or the community at large.
A major impediment to increased household access to credit and savings
services are transaction costs, which are either incurred by the financial institution
delivering the service or by households demanding the service, or both.  Transaction
costs include any costs involved in an exchange of assets or services other than the
price of the asset or service.  The price of borrowing is the interest. Transaction costs
are costs resulting from an information search and market entry and exit costs for
borrowers, savers, and financial intermediaries.  Since transaction costs have the
character of fixed costs, smaller transactions (that is, smaller loans and savings
deposits) have ceteris paribus higher unit transaction costs.9
      See Hazell (1991) for an interesting example of community-based groups in
2
Japan.  The information cost advantage of locally-based groups may be exploited
not only for credit and savings, but also for some types of insurance services.
Recent research shows that high transaction costs due to information asymmetry
appear less of a hindrance in networks of close social interaction (Platteau 1992). 
Indigenous group-based systems may not only link with formal savings and credit
systems, but may also assume functions of insurance—at least for idiosyncratic risks.  
2
Udry (1995) finds that some form of coinsurance is even found between informal
lenders and borrowers:  the level and timing of debt repayment in Nigeria has been
found to be contingent on whether a borrower or lender experienced shocks to income
or not.
Research Areas at the Institutional Level
At the institutional level, the conceptual framework leads to the following
research areas.  As a starting point in understanding the structure of the rural financial
market and the relative importance of particular financial institutions and their
services, a descriptive account of the underlying agroecological and socioeconomic
conditions for each country is given.  The policy framework, in particular, the
regulations affecting the formation and conduct of member-based financial
institutions, are reviewed for each of the country cases in order to identify weaknesses
and strengths in providing a conducive policy environment for bottom-up
development of rural financial institutions.
The second research area relates to the structure of rural financial markets under
different socioeconomic, agroecological, and policy conditions in various case study
countries.  Knowledge about the market volume and relative importance of informal
and formal financial institutions across countries with different agroecological and
socioeconomic conditions, such as level of infrastructure, population density, and10
level of economic development, is very limited.  The initiation and expansion of
member-based financial institutions at the community level is hypothesized to
increase the volume in loans and savings deposits, and to change the structure of the
market by reducing the share of high-cost informal lending.  The analysis of market
shares is expected to provide insights into the scope for the transformation of rural
financial markets through bottom-up development of financial institutions.
The third research area relates to the conduct and performance of selected
formal institutional arrangements that aim to provide credit to poor households
without requiring collateral. In a particular country case study, the research task is to
describe the types of savings and credit services provided by the institution, and to
provide a review of the contractual arrangements, such as interest rates, loan
conditions, and entry and exit barriers for borrowers and savers.  In case countries
where data at the level of formal credit and savings groups are available, an analysis
of the determinants of repayment, as one possible criteria for performance, is expected
to yield recommendations for key design features in the process of group formation
and conducive external rules for the conduct of groups.
The overriding objective of the third research area is to identify comparative
advantages and deficiencies of selected financial institutions in providing the types of
financial services demanded by poor households vis-à-vis informal institutions
offering financial services.  A major working premise is that learning from, building
on, and adapting to informal systems of credit and savings will lead to the
identification and design of sustainable formal savings and credit systems that
complement the informal services. 
Framework for Household-Level Analysis
Given that a particular informal or formal financial institution is known by a
household, the household's access to its credit and savings services will depend on11
various characteristics of the household.  These characteristics determine the
institution's perception regarding household eligibility criteria, such as the reputation,
savings potential, and creditworthiness of the household.  Whether a household uses
its potential access to a particular credit or savings service is dependent on its demand
for such services.  The demand for a financial service is hereby hypothesized to be a
function of the household's initial endowment in physical and human capital, input
and output prices, wages, interest rates and related transaction costs, and costs of
financial services that can serve as substitutes.  
Thus, while access is entirely determined by the financial institution that screens
potential clients, the decision to participate in savings and credit arrangements is made
by the household, or, to be more precise, by the members of the household.
The hypothesized linkages between access to credit and savings options and
household's food security are conceptualized in Figure 1 (Zeller et al. 1994a). Three
pathways are conceptualized through which access to and participation in financial
markets is hypothesized to affect household food security:
! Pathway I:  via income generation;
! Pathway II:  via asset (dis-) investment strategies to smooth
disposable income over time at sufficient food consumption levels;
and,
! Pathway III:  via the direct use of credit to finance immediate
consumption needs.
In Figure 1, the process is depicted by linking a number of boxes.  Each box
indicates a subcomponent of the overall process of altering a household's food security
through improved access to credit and savings options.  Although time subscripts are
not shown, the process is perceived to be dynamic.  A change in access to credit or
saving options through financial markets induces changes in the level and12
composition of a household's equity and debt or in the level and composition of its
assets, or both.  These changes, in turn, cause the household to alter the level and
composition of expenditures on consumption, production, and investment in durables. 
Improved access to credit and savings options have both short-term impacts, e.g.,
increased food consumption by poor households in the hungry period, as well as long-
term impacts, e.g., by allowing physical assets to be built up over time.
Pathway I:  Improved Income Generation.  The traditional rationale for credit policy
is that loans provide additional capital on a temporary basis that can be used to
enhance the level of the household's productive physical capital.  For farm
households, in particular, the demand for credit and savings arises out of the
requirements of the agricultural cycle.  Expenditures must be incurred on agricultural
inputs during the planting and the vegetative growth periods of crops, while returns
are received only after the crops are harvested several months later.  Therefore, to
finance the purchase of inputs, the farm household must either dip into its savings or
obtain credit.  Borrowing may also allow the household to take advantage of
potentially profitable investment opportunities that are too large to finance out of its
own resources.  Furthermore, easing potential capital constraints through credit will
reduce the opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets relative to family labor, thus
encouraging labor-saving technologies and raising labor productivity, a crucial factor
for development, in particular, in many African countries (Delgado 1995).
A second, indirect effect on factor income to be measured in our analysis is
that derived from access to credit, and not from borrowing.  Access to credit, i.e.,
unexhausted credit lines, is expected to increase the household's risk-bearing ability. 
Just the knowledge that credit will be available to cushion consumption against an
income shortfall if a potentially profitable, but risky, investment should turn out badly13
will induce the household to bear the additional risk.  The household may therefore be
willing to adopt new, more risky technologies (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990).
Compared to households that are not rationed in their credit demand by
lenders, it is hypothesized that (controlling for other factors influencing resource use,
such as wealth and education) credit-constrained households will have
!  a lower intensity of modern input use;
!  more income diversification to minimize risk; and,
!  less capital-intensive, income-earning activities.
In summary, while actual participation in credit and savings markets are
expected to have a direct effect on income generation through investment in
agricultural and off-farm enterprises, the access to credit is hypothesized to have an
indirect effect on factor income through increased risk-bearing ability and resulting
changes in the portfolio of risky enterprises.
Pathway II:  More Cost-Efficient Assets and Liabilities.  Improved access to credit
and savings schemes may make it possible for the household to smooth consumption
at lower costs compared to traditional strategies.  It is hypothesized that improved
access to credit and savings options induces the following changes in the household's
composition of assets and liabilities:
! A decrease in the holding of assets with lower risk-adjusted
returns.  Traditional forms of savings such as cash, jewelry,
grain, or livestock are exposed to various risks (inflation, theft,
loss, or disease).  Households will substitute away from them if
they can have less risky savings options.14
! A reduction in the level of assets held for precautionary savings
(Deaton 1991).
! An increase in the level of assets held for speculative purposes,
such as storing of grain for a longer period in order to profit
from higher prices in the next preharvest season.
! A decline in the level of credit obtained at high costs from
informal sources, including forward sales of standing crops.
! A decline in the level of asset sales at low prices. 
Pathway III:  "Consumption" Credit.  Households attempt to smooth their
consumption by adjusting their disposable income.  If factor income is insufficient
because of shocks, households may augment their nonfactor income by using some or
all of the strategies described above, or by borrowing for consumption.  Credit and
savings facilities may be especially needed in environments with considerable
seasonal and interannual income fluctuations.  
Consumption credit is still a controversial issue in policy and program design. 
Most formal programs do not offer credit for consumption smoothing.  Informal
systems of savings, self-help, and insurance, as well as high-cost lending, appear to
have comparative advantages for covering idiosyncratic shocks, but may not be an
efficient institutional response to covariate risks (Townsend 1994).  MP5 aims to
assess the scope for providing formal credit and savings services for consumption
smoothing and to assess the scope to increase the supply of informal credit for
consumption smoothing, i.e., the linkages between informal and formal markets.
Formal and informal credit options, various forms of informal saving, loans
given by the household, gifts (given and received), and other forms of informal
insurance are perceived in our framework as "financial commodities," being imperfect
substitutes.  That is, after controlling for differential implicit or explicit interest rates15
and transaction costs as well as supply constraints, a typical household will have a
preference among these different types of financial commodities.  In other words,
even if all households were equally endowed and faced the same interest rates,
transaction costs, and credit constraints, they would choose different mixes and levels
of the types of financial commodities (loans/savings/gifts), depending on their
respective preferences.  
In summary, it is hypothesized that improved access to credit and savings
services either augments factor income generated by the production process or
reduces costs for smoothing consumption at sufficient levels.  The latter effect, i.e.,
smoothing disposable income by borrowing for consumption or by saving in highly
liquid, but less remunerative, assets, including the accumulation of claims to
neighbors and friends through reciprocal gift exchange, is expected to be relatively
more important for households that face the risk of transitory or chronic food
insecurity.  The hypothesized differences in the relative importance of the three
pathways for wealthy versus poor households may also explain the observed
differential patterns in the borrowing and savings behavior of households in the case
studies of MP5.
Survey data from most of the nine case countries of MP5 show that at least
some sample households are borrowers and lenders as well as gift takers and gift
givers at the same time.  This suggests that a given amount of a financial commodity
of a certain type can be traded (i.e., substitutable) at a finite premium, with a financial
commodity of a different type having a less preferred vector of "noncost"-attributes
(i.e., attributes that do not include the level of interest rate, transaction costs, and
supply constraints, and which are attached to each type of financial commodity).  This
also suggests that some of the financial commodities may, in fact, be complements
rather than substitutes.  Those households who choose not to borrow by preference,
regardless of cost considerations, may, instead, save (sometimes with negative16
returns) in anticipation of possible liquidity constraints, and engage in reciprocal gift
giving (including giving away interest-free loans) as an insurance scheme.
The Research Tasks at the Household Level
The conceptual framework at the household level outlines three potential
pathways through which access to financial services and participation in borrowing
and saving can have effects on household food security and on the level of education
and nutritional status of its members. The three pathways are interconnected and
dynamic.  
Based on this framework, the household-level analysis is grouped into three
major research areas.  The first area relates to the access of households and individual
members to financial services, in particular, to informal and formal credit from
various institutions, including other households.  In general terms, access is defined as
the ability of the household or its members to enter into contractual arrangements for
savings and credit services.  For example, some households may not be able to borrow
from banks because of collateral requirements, whereas most of the households found
in the MP5 case studies are able to borrow from at least some informal lenders. 
Within this research area, the MP aims to (1) measure access and (2) to quantify
policy-relevant determinants of such access.  Both research questions need to be
further differentiated by type of financial institution offering the credit, by type of
loan, and by type of household or individual member having access to a particular
credit from a particular institution.
The second area relates to the analysis of participation of households in formal
and informal savings and credit markets.  As noted above, participation is observed
when a household applies for and successfully enters into a contractual arrangement
for a credit or savings service.  Thus, participation is dependent on access and on the
demand for the service.  While the former is decided by the financial intermediary, the17
latter is determined by the household or its members.  Based on this framework, some
households may have access to a service, but do not demand it.  Such households are
therefore observed as nonparticipants.  Another group of households does not have
access, but demands the service.  This group is also observed in surveys as
nonparticipants.  Within the research area related to participation, the MP aims (1) to
measure the occurrence of participation and its extent, i.e., the amount borrowed or
the savings deposited; and (2) to identify the underlying determinants of participation
in informal and formal markets.  Again, these questions are addressed for different
segments of the financial market, and for different groupings of households and
individuals.  Furthermore, the research attempts to quantify the costs of participation,
i.e., explicit as well as implicit interest charges and transaction costs.
The analysis of policy-relevant determinants of access and of participation will
yield insights related to the scope for enhanced access and participation of the poor, as
this is envisaged by the first policy question of this MP.
The third research area at the household level aims to quantify the benefits of
access to and participation in financial markets on household food security.  Based on
the three pathways, gains in welfare can result through an increase in income and,
consequently, increase in consumption; or through reduction in costs for smoothing of
consumption.  Under certain conditions, participation in specialized credit programs
(such as group-based targeted credit programs for the poor with education and
training components) can also have direct beneficial outcomes such as improved
health and nutrition, and positive social change.  Within this research area, the MP
addresses the following research questions.  First, the research seeks to quantify the
effects of access and of participation on (1) income; (2) level and seasonal fluctuations
in consumption expenditures and calorie intake; and (3) nutritional status of
preschoolers.  Second, the program seeks to quantify the degree of substitution
between informal and formal financial services.  Third, in some of the case studies18
where a complete enumeration and long-term recall for assets and participation in
credit markets has been done, the research aims to analyze long-term effects on the
level of human and physical capital of the household.  
The major research question within the third research area is to find out how
much economic benefit (either measured by disposable income, consumption
expenditure, or bettered by monetary measures of welfare), on average and at the
margin, can be generated from one yuan, taka, peso, franc, kwacha, or rupee of credit. 
This information is highly relevant for evaluating public investments in the initiation
and expansion of credit programs for the rural poor, as financial and economic costs
of such interventions can be readily approximated, given the availability of data from
balance sheets and profit and loss statements from financial intermediaries.  
However, since public resources are scarce, a full answer to the efficiency of
investing in rural financial institutions in a specific country context can only be given
when costs and benefits of investments in financial institutions are compared with
costs and benefits of alternative policy interventions, such as income transfer
programs, price stabilization programs, and liberalization in input and output markets.
In Table 1, the major research areas and research questions of the multicountry
program are summarized. Furthermore, it gives an overview of the country case
studies for which data have been collected to address part or all of these questions.
DATA SOURCES
Six out of nine MP5 country cases (Bangladesh, Malawi, Madagascar, Ghana,
Mali, and Nepal) focused on group-based lending approaches. A seventh country case,
Cameroon, included informal savings and credit associations as the unit of analysis. 
However, data on conduct and performance of group-based approaches is currently
available only for Madagascar, Bangladesh, and Cameroon. 19
This project focuses on two levels of analysis:  households demanding and
institutions supplying financial services within their communities or regions.
Extensive household surveys are required to capture the degree of participation
in informal and formal credit and savings markets, and to trace the effects of financial
intermediation on the asset portfolio, income, consumption, and nutrition.
In principle, the surveys contain an enumeration of the stock of assets
possessed or used by the household, the investment/disinvestment flows during the
recall periods, the stock and flow of the household's debt, and the various income
flows during the recall periods (including gifts and other transfers), the household's
food consumption and nonfood expenditures, and anthropometric measures.  Time
costs and other transaction costs for obtaining credit and depositing savings need to be
enumerated.  For some modules, that is, asset ownership, income, gifts, and credit, it
may be preferable—depending on country conditions—that individual household
members are interviewed.
The collected information also includes issues on selected traditional coping
strategies that are identified as important through rapid appraisal techniques and
interviews with key informants.  For example, the sale of standing crops may be quite
frequently observed in one case country, while it may not be found in other cases.  It
is also preferable that questionnaires address some long-term recall data on the build-
up and sale of key assets (such as land), major shocks, and corresponding coping
strategies during the household history.
Multiple survey rounds in the hungry, harvest, and postharvest seasons are
required to be conducted for capturing seasonal linkages between participation in
financial markets and factor income generation, nonfactor incomes (gifts, credit, asset
disinvestment), consumption expenditures, and savings (change in assets net corrected
for debt).20
Table 1—Research areas and research questions of MP5
Research Area Research Question Data Available
A. Institutional-Level Analysis
Policy framework and exogenous Conducive policy and regulatory All countries
conditions framework for bottom-up develop-
ment of rural financial market
Structure of rural financial market Volume and sectoral shares in Based on household-
loans and savings deposits of level data from all
households countries
Conduct and performance of rural Process of formation of groups M, B, Ca
financial institutions (in particular,
group-based) Structure of groups M, B, Ca
Conduct of groups (services M, B, Ca, N, C, Mw
and their contractual
arrangements)
Loan repayment performance in M, B, Ca
groups
Transaction costs of and Available from registered
dependency on subsidies by financial institutions
rural financial institutions
B. Household-Level Analysis
Access to formal/informal credit Measurement of access Ca, M, Mw, P, B
Determinants of access Ca, M, Mw, P, B
Participation in credit markets Measurement of participation All countries
Determinants of participation All countries
Effects of access/participation on Effects on . . .
household food security and welfare • Factor income Ca, M, Mw, B, P
• Consumption All countries
• Nutrition All countries, except
C, N
Note: Ca = Cameroon, C = China, M = Madagascar, Mw = Malawi, Ml = Mali, G = Ghana, B = Bangladesh,
P = Pakistan, N = Nepal.21
Questions on assets and debt cover extremely sensitive and personal topics.  The
organization of the field survey therefore allows for sufficient time for testing of
questionnaires, for training of survey personnel, and for confidence building between
survey personnel, communities, and respondents.  The sensitivity of the topic, the
necessity of multiple rounds, and the required depth of data call for a small sample
size, because a large sample size is likely to be prohibitively costly. Furthermore, for
the country cases already implemented, budget considerations have usually restricted
us to conduct the household-level survey only in communities where the formal credit
and savings programs are located.  Households were then randomly selected among
participants and nonparticipants of the credit and savings programs of interest.  Pitt
and Khandker (1994) rightly point out that effects of credit programs are best assessed
by comparing participants with nonparticipants who live in villages without program
interventions, as there are potential spillover effects in program villages on the
welfare of nonparticipants.  However, effects measured in MP5 country studies cannot
control for these presumably positive spillover effects on nonparticipants, and
therefore may somewhat underestimate the welfare effects of participation in credit
and savings programs.
Surveys at the institutional level focus on the structure, conduct, and
performance of selected group-based informal and formal institutions that provide
financial services.  Emphasis is put on surveying innovative institutional
arrangements, and on understanding the socioeconomic conditions under which they
work.  Survey components include the organization and member characteristics of the
groups, and their transaction costs, including entry and exit barriers that may inhibit
access by the disadvantaged.
Surveys at the community level in various regions collect data on hypothesized
determinants of the demand and supply of financial services.  The survey includes
topics on village infrastructure, demographics, and existence of formal and informal22
groups and other institutional arrangements that provide credit, savings, or insurance
services.  Additional data on infrastructure and other characteristics of regions and
communities is being obtained from secondary sources.  The communities are
randomly selected, whereby the population is to be stratified along exogenous driving
forces for financial market formation, such as infrastructure, population density, and
agroecological conditions. 
Rapid appraisal surveys at the project level (cooperatives, rural banks,
nongovernmental organizations, agribusinesses extending credit) obtain selected
information on management objectives, rules of conduct for savings and credit
services, performance incentives and training, costs of financial intermediation, and
outreach.
Table 2 provides an overview of the country case studies within the scope of
MP5.  In 1995, researchers at IFPRI and at collaborating institutions have conducted
data analysis and collection at household and institutional levels for the Bangladesh,
China, Cameroon, Mali, Malawi, Ghana, Nepal, Pakistan, and Madagascar country
cases. 
Since MP5 is a multicountry project with six out of nine case studies being
initiated before 1993 (Ghana, Mali, Pakistan, Madagascar, Cameroon, Nepal), not all
of the case studies have the required survey data as described above. 
Table 3 shows differences in survey modules across country cases.  For
example, four of the nine country cases (Ghana, Mali, Pakistan, Nepal) lack
information at the level of financial institutions and, thus, some of the research tasks
of MP5 at the institutional level cannot be universally addressed.  
Most of the data sets have the key information to address the questions at the
household level.  However, survey data for measuring access and participation are not
congruent across the countries, as the earlier studies did not obtain information on the
occurrence of voluntary nonborrowing and of nonborrowing because of rejections by23
lenders.  Also, most studies, with the exception of Madagascar, Bangladesh, and
Malawi, did not elicit information on access and participation at the member level, but
only at the household level, so that the scope for intrahousehold and, in particular,
gender-differentiated analysis is limited in most countries.  The incongruence of
household-level data forces us to employ less preferred methodological approaches if
we want to apply the same methodology for all countries.
Furthermore, except for Ghana and China, the data sets comprise multiple
rounds, so that effects of access to credit and savings options on intertemporal
consumption smoothing and income generation can be analyzed.
In conclusion, it is important to note that many of the country cases do not allow
for a synthesis of comparable analytical results related to all policy questions, but only
to a subset of research issues of MP5.24
Table 2—Summary of actual country case studies (as of October 1995)
a
             Project Phases              
Case Study Proposal Survey Country
Researchers Implementing Institution Country Accepted Completed Reports
Franz Heidhues,  IFPRI/Univ. of Hohenheim/ Cameroon Y Y Y
  Gertrud Schrieder CamCCUL/CAC (1992)
Ellen Payongayong, IFPRI, FFH Mali Y Y Y
  Lawrence Haddad (1992)
  Hugo de Groote, 
  Eileen Kennedy
Ellen Payongayong  IFPRI Ghana Y Y Y
  Lawrence Haddad (1992)
Manohar Sharma Cornell University/IFPRI Nepal Y Y N
(1992)
Sohail Malik, IFPRI Pakistan Y Y Y
  Sumiter Broca,  (1994)
  Manzoor Gill
Joachim von Braun, IFPRI/Univ. of Kiel/Chinese China Y Y Y
  Zhu Ling, Academy of Social Sciences (1995)
 Jiang Zhong Yi
Manfred Zeller, IFPRI Bangladesh Y Y Y
  Akhter Ahmed, (1995)
  Manohar Sharma
Manfred Zeller, IFPRI/CNRE/FOFIFA Madagascar Y Y Y
  Henri Abel-Ratavo, (1992)
  Bjorg Colding
Aliou Diagne, IFPRI/Bunda College of Malawi Y Y Y
  Manfred Zeller, Agriculture (1995)
  Charles Mataya,
  Suresh Babu
Additional cross-country analyses are planned on the basis of existing data sets from other collaborating
a
institutions, e.g., the University of California at Berkeley for the case of survey data on Mexico.2
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Table 3—Survey modules of MP5 country case studies
Survey Modules Bangladesh Cameroon Ghana Mali Madagascar Nepal Pakistan China Malawi
1. Village level Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N
c
2. Group level Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
3. Household level Y Y
 (Secondary
data)
Number of rounds 3 3 1 3 3 4 Overall 15, 1 3
credit in 6
rounds
Demography Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Agricultural income Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Nonagricultural income Y
-Wage, self-employment Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
b
-Rental Income, individual
  individual lending Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
b
-Gifts received Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
b
-Borrowing Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
b
-Asset disinvestment Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Consumption expenditure
(including food consumption) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Asset investment Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time allocation Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y
Anthropometry Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y
Transaction costs in borrowing
and lending Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y
c
Loan rationing Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
d
N = No, Y = Yes
a
Only for 1st Ghana survey.
b
Only for 2nd Ghana survey.
c
Only in two rounds.
d26
3.  METHODOLOGIES FOR MP5 ANALYSIS
Based on the research objectives, the conceptual framework and data available
from the nine country cases, Chapter III presents the methodologies for our analysis. 
The first section discusses the approaches for analysis at the institutional level. The
second section focuses on household-level analysis.
METHODOLOGIES FOR ANALYSIS AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL 
In the following, our approaches in addressing the research tasks at the
institutional level are described.  We begin this with the analysis of policy framework
and exogenous conditions influencing rural financial markets, then focusing on the
structure, and then on the conduct and performance of financial institutions.
Policy Framework and Exogenous Conditions
Institutional formation depends on demand and supply factors, and transaction
costs for the market partners play a crucial role.  From the viewpoint of the financial
intermediary, transaction costs must be covered by an appropriate interest spread
between interest rates for savings and loans.  For the borrower, the net economic gain
is the difference between the return on capital and the interest paid as well as the
transaction costs incurred for obtaining and repaying the loan.  For providing
attractive savings options, similar reasoning holds.
A market, or a particular financial institution, will only be sustainable if
transaction costs are low enough to ensure the economic viability of its transactions,
both from the viewpoint of supply and demand.  One can conceive exogenous
conditions under which markets will be missing, thin, or only seasonally working,
and, on the other hand, under which they are well-integrated.  Policies and programs27
to enhance rural financial markets have to take into account these conditions.  Some
may be efficiently altered by policies, others cannot.
The formation or innovation of financial institutions is hypothesized to depend
on a range of factors that affect either supply or demand or both.  Theoretical
frameworks explaining the formation or innovation of institutions due to relative
scarcity of factor endowments (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Binswanger and
Rosenzweig 1986; Binswanger, McIntire, and Udry 1989) and due to market failures
requiring collective action (Ostrom 1994) lead to the following hypothesized
determinants apart from public policy and interventions by nongovernmental
organizations:
! level of commercialization of the economy;
! relative scarcity of land and labor;
! population density and education levels; 
! level of hard and soft infrastructure;
! level of technology;
! and, for member-based institutions, the degree of social cohesion
(Robison and Schmid 1988) between households living in the same
community or region, which may enhance community self-help action; 
! degree of seasonality and interannual instability of major income sources;
! type and degree of idiosyncratic and covariate risks that households,
communities, or regions are exposed to; and
! existence and structure of markets for collateral, that is, land.
As a starting point in understanding the policy framework influencing the
formation of rural financial institutions and their structure, conduct, and performance
in a particular case country, the current state of macroeconomic and financial sector28
policies is described (McKinnon 1973, 1988).  Particular emphasis will be given to
the legal framework that regulates the banking sector, such as interest rate restrictions
for savings and deposits, deposit insurance, loan guarantee funds, and guidelines for
sector-specific loan targeting, etc. (Villanueva and Mirakhor 1990).  Since the focus
of the multicountry program is on member-based financial institutions operating at the
community level, such as cooperatives, group-based programs, and village banks, the
regulations guiding the formation of such institutions and affecting their conduct and
performance are reviewed.  This analysis will help to identify constraints to the
liberalization and decentralization of financial markets.  For the case of Egypt, for
example, the government's regulation that the parastatal agricultural development
bank is not allowed to offer checking accounts to their rural customers, is an
important impediment for the bank to diversify and expand its financial services and
clientele (Aly, Malik, and Zeller 1994).  The analysis of the current state of policies is
further expanded by a chronology of policies affecting the rural financial market, and
by relating those policies to changes in time series data of formal interest rates for
savings and loans and of lending volume by economic sector or by type of financial
institution.  However, it is beyond the scope of this multicountry program to explain
the historic development of interest rates and market volumes in a quantitative
framework.  
Apart from the policy framework, socioeconomic and agroecological conditions
of the case country govern the development of rural financial markets, of which only
some can be altered by government policy.  Following the above hypothesized
determinants of the formation of financial institutions, a descriptive account of the
following conditions for each country is given: agroclimatic zones, population density
and level of urbanization, endowment and quality of land, endowment with labor, land
tenure system, level of economic development, level of education of labor force,
frequency of occurrence of covariate risks (drought, floods, price fluctuations of29
major inputs and outputs, etc.) and of idiosyncratic risks (morbidity rates, life
expectancy, level of nutritional status, etc.), and degree of seasonal fluctuations in
agricultural production.
Structure of the Financial Market
The second research area relates to the structure of rural financial markets under
the different socioeconomic, agroecological, and policy conditions in the various case
study countries. 
The descriptive analysis begins with an overview of informal and formal
financial institutions that provide savings and credit services in rural areas. The
following formal and informal financial institutions are therefore differentiated:
private banks; parastatal banks, including agricultural development banks; savings
and credit cooperatives; member-managed village banks; formal group-based savings
and credit institutions; informal credit and savings groups; and various forms of other
informal institutions (shopkeepers, traders, landlords, including estate farmers,
relatives, and friends).
Secondary data published by government sources usually provide information
on lending volumes by economic sector.  However, it does not report on the relative
importance of the informal versus the formal sector for lending to rural households,
with the exception of a few, mostly Asian countries.  The data collected at the
household level in various sample communities will therefore be aggregated at the
community or higher level to give an indication of the volume of savings deposits and
loans, differentiated by informal and formal financial institutions.  In some case study
countries, such as Madagascar, Cameroon, and Bangladesh, additional information on
existence and functions of informal self-help groups and number of shopkeepers,
traders, and moneylenders providing credit in the community or nearby has been
collected.  However, in order to obtain information on market shares and loan volume,30
household-level data are seen as the most reliable and cost-efficient source.  It has to
be pointed out that the sample frame and size in all MP5 countries does not allow for
nationally representative figures.
Desai and Mellor (1993) provide a multicountry analysis of shares of formal and
informal credit sources for farm households in selected developed and developing
countries. Again, these results are based on the aggregation of data collected at the
household level.  They find that the share of formal sources is increasing with the
level of economic development. However, in their analysis of extant data sets, Desai
and Mellor do not differentiate by the maturity of the loan.  Thus, a monetary unit
borrowed for three months from an informal lender is counted the same as a monetary
unit borrowed for three years from a formal lender.  Furthermore, it is not clear what
recall period was used in the individual household surveys for loan transactions.  In
essence, loans and deposits are flow variables, and need to be measured accordingly. 
In order to avoid difficulties in interpretation of results across countries, the average
loan amount borrowed per month from a particular institution is being computed, and
market volume and shares are then derived on this basis.
Of particular interest in the analysis of market shares is also the relative
importance of zero-interest lending by friends and relatives versus high-interest
lending by socially distant lenders.  Furthermore, by comparing across countries or
regions within a country with different agroecological and socioeconomic conditions,
it is attempted to identify some generalizable results about the structure of the
informal market and its relative importance compared to the formal market.  Malik
finds in his study on source structure and utilization patterns of credit that the
subsidized formal agricultural credit institutions, by disbursing large amounts of credit
over the years to mainly owner-operated and wealthier farm households, has not been
able to reduce the share of the informal sector, although the difference in interest rates31
between the informal and the formal sector appear to have converged over time
(Malik 1994).
The initiation and expansion of member-based financial institutions at the
community level is hypothesized to increase the volume in loans and savings deposits
by rural households without collateral, and change the structure of the market by
reducing the share of high-interest informal lending.  The results from several MP5
countries, such as Bangladesh, Cameroon, and Madagascar, confirm the former
hypothesis.  However, the role of high-interest borrowing in these countries does not
appear to be affected by status of membership.  This may be explained by the fact that
few of the formal group-based credit programs in these countries offer credit for
consumption at short notice.  It is further hypothesized that the share of zero-interest
informal lending by friends and relatives is decreasing with increased access to and
diversity of formal financial services and with overall economic development.  The
analysis of market shares across countries is expected to provide insights into the
scope for transformation of rural financial markets through bottom-up development of
financial institutions.
A comparative, descriptive analysis of market volumes and shares,
differentiated by main characteristics of policy framework and socioeconomic and
agroecological conditions, will be conducted in order to identify common patterns
between structure of the rural financial market and the underlying exogenous
conditions.
Conduct and Performance of Financial Institutions
Our analysis follows the paradigm of structure, conduct, and performance
(Williamson 1985).  The analysis of conduct is exclusively geared towards member-
based institutions, such as village banks, formal groups, and credit and savings
cooperatives.  In our sample of nine countries, group-based programs play a dominant32
role in six of the countries.  In China and Cameroon, credit and savings cooperatives
are found.  In the latter country, a very active sector of informal savings and credit
associations exists, which has been extensively surveyed (Schrieder and Heidhues
1993; Schrieder and Cuevas 1992).  Pakistan still maintains a traditional-type
agricultural development bank, which is unable to include the poor to a significant
extent, as it demands collateral and imposes other restrictions (von Braun, Malik, and
Zeller 1993).  Since the group-based approach—either promoted by government or by
nongovernmental organizations—apparently has become the dominant institutional
form for providing financial services to poor households without physical collateral,
the multicountry project is mainly focusing on group-based approaches in its cross-
country analysis.
The analysis of conduct and performance of a group-based system begins with
the process of group formation.  This process then, in turn, determines the structure of
groups and, to a large extent, their conduct and performance.  As most groups are
formed through self-selection among peers, the process of group formation is seen as
endogenous.  The process is influenced by rules of access and conduct imposed by the
formal financial institution, and by household and community-level characteristics. 
Therefore, our approach is to identify externally imposed rules of access and conduct
of groups through a review of program guidelines and interviews with program
officers.  In particular, for each of the group-based programs sampled in the case
countries, the formal criteria for eligibility in groups are highlighted, such as payment
of initial membership fee, minimum amount saved, being member of a particular
socioeconomic class, or participation in a training program.  In some of the case
studies, i.e., Bangladesh and Madagascar for formal groups and Cameroon for
informal groups, surveys at the level of groups were conducted to identify rules of
access which were internally set by the group.  The descriptive analysis of externally
or internally set rules aims to highlight factors that influence the structure of a group. 33
Research by the MP5 team along these lines includes a literature survey of member-
based financial institutions in developing countries (Zeller et al. 1994a), and country
reports for Bangladesh (Zeller, Ahmed, and Sharma 1995), Madagascar (Zeller et al.
1993, and Cameroon (Schrieder and Heidhues 1993).
The structure, i.e., the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual members
and its social and economic relations to each other, determines to a large extent the
degree to which the group can exploit commonly held information sets among
members and economies in sharing of risks.  From the perspective of the financial
intermediary, a group is formed as an institutional arrangement that can reduce its
transaction costs and possibly increase the rate of repayment compared to individual
lending.  From the perspective of an individual, his or her motivation to join a group
is to benefit from the present and future financial and nonfinancial services that come
along with membership.  Groups in most of the case countries assume joint liability. 
Combined with a threat of losing access to future credit, members are induced to
perform various functions of screening of loan applicants; of monitoring the
individual borrower's efforts, fortunes, and shocks; and of enforcing repayment of the
loan of their peers.  The existing theoretical models of peer monitoring deduce that the
repayment performance in group-lending programs is positively related to the
homogeneity of members with respect to the riskiness of their projects (Devereux and
Fishe 1993; Besley and Coate 1993, 1995).  However, this result appears to be driven
by the models' assumption that the expected returns of the member's projects are
independent from each other, so that no economies of risk-sharing among group
members can be exploited (Zeller 1995b).  It seems plausible, that the same incentive
structure that incites members to monitor the projects of peers may also make them
want to enter into coinsurance contracts.  Udry shows in his analysis that state-
contingent contracts are chosen in informal credit markets in Nigeria that allow for
direct risk pooling between the creditor and the debtor (Udry 1995).  There appears to34
be no reason to believe that such state-contingent contracts could not exist between
members of groups with joint liability who want to maximize the utility from the
present and from future loans through collective action.
Based on this framework, the following characteristics for group structure are
analyzed for each of the country studies where data at the group level have been
collected.  First, the share of members having common social bonds, such as same
profession, religion, neighborhood, gender, etc., are characteristics that give an
indication for the degree of commonalities of information sets among members for
efficient screening and monitoring of the efforts of the peers.  Second, the size of the
group at various points in time during the existence of the group is recorded, as size
influences unit transaction costs for members and economies of risk sharing among
groups.  Third, characteristics of the individual members and their households, such as
education, land ownership, primary occupation, etc., are enumerated.  Statistical
analysis of these characteristics can then inform us about the degree of homogeneity
for various socioeconomic characteristics that influence the potential for sharing risks,
including the repayment of loans of members in crisis.  Descriptive analysis along
these lines has been done for the cases of Bangladesh and Madagascar.
With respect to conduct of groups, the research identifies financial and
nonfinancial services that are externally offered by the program or internally supplied
at the initiative of the group members themselves.  For example, the analysis of the
Cameroon, Bangladesh, and Madagascar data set shows that groups expand the range
of services, mainly by setting up group emergency funds for protecting members in
difficulties and for providing highly liquid monetary savings options. The contractual
arrangements, such as interest rate, collateral requirements, loan sizing, restrictions on
use of loans, liquidity of savings options, and insurance services for idiosyncratic risks
are quantified.  Combined with the household-level survey, the contractual
arrangements in the formal market are compared with those of the informal market in35
order to assess gaps and inefficiencies in formal supply.  For example, Zeller et al.
(1994b) conducted such an analysis for several formal and informal rural financial
institutions in The Gambia.
Performance of group-based institutions can be measured by various criteria. 
Based on a literature review (Zeller et al. 1994a), the following performance measures
will be applied in the country cases:
! measures of financial performance, such as unit transaction costs (Desai
and Mellor 1993), and the degree of dependency of the financial
institution on subsidies (Yaron 1992a), as well as measuring economic
costs and benefits of public investments in rural financial institutions; and
! measures related to coverage of the poor, such as the share of
smallholders and landless participating in member-based financial
institutions or the share of loans obtained by the poor from a particular
institution or segment of the formal market.  These measures of
participation of the poor are discussed in the section covering the
household-level analysis.
With respect to financial performance as an indicator for financial viability of
the institution, data collected from financial institutions can be used to compute unit
transaction costs.  This cost measure is completed by first obtaining administrative
and operation costs of the financial institutions, and dividing the total costs by the sum
of assets (i.e., loans) and liabilities (i.e., savings) to arrive at transaction cost per unit
lent or received from savers.  This approach has been applied by several researchers
(Cuevas 1984; Desai and Mellor 1993).  The advantage of this approach is that it
avoids making arbitrary allocations of transaction costs to particular operations within
a financial institution.  The financial performance can then be assessed by subtracting36
transaction costs and interest costs for liabilities from the total revenues of the
financial institution.  Desai and Mellor propose to assess the financial viability also on
a per unit basis, so that financial performance can be compared across financial
institutions.  Again, the unit is derived from all assets plus all liabilities of the
financial institution.  While revenues and costs can be obtained from profit and loss
statements, the latter is easily derived from balance sheets.  However, most financial
institutions that were surveyed in the field, with the exception of larger
nongovernment organizations in Bangladesh and the credit cooperatives in Cameroon,
do not have such information readily available.
While the above measures of performance relate to the financial viability of a
financial institution without consideration of policy distortions, the subsidy
dependency index measures the degree of dependence of a financial institution on
subsidies.  This methodology was developed and successfully applied by Yaron to
four financial institutions operating in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand (Yaron
1992b).  By including the market rate into the calculation, and by identifying direct
and indirect subsidies by the government or donors to the financial institution, the
financial sustainability can be assessed for the case that subsidies are dismantled.
However, the above measures of performance are financial criteria, not criteria
for economic evaluation of programs.  For an economic evaluation of the use of
public funds for financial institutions, the amount of subsidy required by a financial
institution to reach financial viability, as defined by Yaron, has to be compared to the
benefits that are generated at the household level by having access to the savings or
credit services offered by the financial institution.  For multicountry comparisons,
subsidies and benefits could be expressed per unit of money lent by the financial
institution.  The valuation of benefits may also take into account explicit social
weights for disadvantaged population groups in order to also reflect on equity
objectives of financial market policy. This cost-benefit-analysis of public investments37
in financial institutions has not yet been exemplified in the literature, probably
because of the lack of quantification of welfare benefits.  However, many studies have
quantified the costs of financial institutions, and their dependency on subsidies.  Thus,
while the methodologies related to the costs side are fairly well-developed, this cannot
be said for the measurement of benefits of financial services at the household level. 
This is one of the major reasons why MP5 puts more emphasis on the demand side
rather than the supply side of financial services.
For financial institutions, the repayment rate for loans is a critical determinant
of financial viability.  For Madagascar and Bangladesh, data has been collected at the
group level to analyze the determinants of repayment.  Based on the previous
discussion, repayment performance in group-based credit schemes is initially
determined by the process of formation of groups.  This process influences the
composition and structure of the group, and therefore conditions its ultimate conduct
and performance, given exogenous characteristics of the program and of the group's
community and local economy.  Thus, the member's decision to self-select herself and
co-select her peers is governed or influenced by external regulations and
characteristics of the credit program and socioeconomic and agroecological conditions
of the households and communities.  In the following, while the proposed approach
does not attempt to model the different stages of group formation and definition of
internal rules of conduct to repayment, it attempts to incorporate dependent variables
that reflect on the process of group formation, the composition and structure of the
group and the relationships between members, and on various community
characteristics.
The repayment rate of group loans at the due date could be chosen as the
dependent variable.  Cross-section data from various groups of several credit and
savings programs will be collected for institution-specific (I), community-specific (C),38
and group-specific (G) characteristics that are expected to influence the repayment
rate (Zeller 1995b).
Repayment rate = f (characteristics of financial institution, community, group)
Variations of this basic model are currently developed by Sharma and Zeller for
the Bangladesh data and Zeller for the Madagascar data. While program-specific
characteristics could be reflected by dummies, the community characteristics could,
for example, include the following.  First, with increasing transport costs to rural
service centers, transaction costs for training, monitoring, and supervision of groups
increase.  It is expected that higher transaction costs result in less training, monitoring,
and supervision of groups that live in remote villages.  As these activities are
undertaken to increase loan repayment, higher transport costs are expected to have a
negative influence on loan repayment.  Second, villages usually differ by the degree of
commercialization, market orientation, and, therefore, monetarization.  It is expected
that groups in villages with higher levels of monetarization, as measured by the share
of cash crops of their three most important cash crops, will be able to better raise the
necessary cash to make timely loan repayments.  Monetarization is measured by the
cumulative percentage of the harvest of the major three cash crops that are sold in the
market.  Third, the existence of retailers for agricultural inputs is expected to be
positively related to repayment performance, since such inputs become more readily
available and cheaper for farmers in villages that have access to input markets.  As
agricultural inputs are yield-enhancing, the repayment capacity and repayment rate of
groups with good access to agricultural inputs is expected to increase.  Fourth, risks in
crop and animal production, as well as storage of crops, can undermine repayment
performance.  In a survey at the community level with key respondents, potential risk39
factors in crop and animal production as well as storage have been assessed in their
relative importance. 
In addition to community-specific variables, the repayment is also expected to
be influenced by characteristics of the group and its members.  These may include a
dummy whether the group was initiated by a program officer or by the members of the
community.  Furthermore, group size is expected to augment the repayment rate but at
a decreasing and, at some point, negative rate, because of increasing information
asymmetry among members and therefore a higher risk of loan default. While
wealthier households have a higher repayment capacity, they may not necessarily
better repay their debt.  Characteristics on the mean and dispersion of key assets, such
as land, among group members, measures the degree of intra-group diversification of
risky assets.  Such measures can then be used as regressors to measure the effect of
pooling risks by co-selecting peers who have a different level and structure of asset
portfolios.  However, with any risk portfolio and coinsurance strategy, too much of
diversification increases the costs of monitoring and decreases the expected returns in
exchange for decreasing gains in the reduction of variance of returns.  Furthermore,
education of members may play a role in the repayment of loans.  Finally, the degree
to which group members enter insurance contracts with each other is expected to be
influenced by the social cohesion between them.  As reciprocity and self-help are
more frequently found among socially close individuals, the number of common
social bonds that each member shares with her peers could be taken, for example, as
an empirical variable to reflect on the degree of social cohesion.
The above approach focuses on the repayment rate as the dependent variable in
a reduced-form regression framework, but does not explain the determinants leading
to the structure and the conduct of the group.  In order to address these issues, our
research will also attempt to analyze these determinants. A recursive modelling
approach, beginning with the initial structure of the group at the time of formation,40
then focusing on the conduct of the group (i.e., the rules and services defined by the
members themselves), and finally analyzing the loan repayment as one of the potential
final outcome variables appears heretofore appropriate.
METHODOLOGIES FOR ANALYSIS AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Based on the conceptual framework, it was hypothesized that the optimal levels
of consumption, production, and investment of a household that faces liquidity
constraints are different from, and provide lower utility than, the optimal levels in the
absence of credit constraints.  This insight suggests the following research questions. 
First, are credit constraints present, if so how severe is access to credit limited by
rationing on behalf of formal or informal lenders, and how are they to be measured? 
Second, given access to credit, what is the extent of credit demand and demand and
supply of other financial commodities (gifts, loans given, savings), and what are the
determinants of participation in credit markets?  Third, how does one measure the
impact of a relaxation of the credit constraint on household utility and consumption
and production? In the following, we review methodologies for addressing these
three questions.
Access to Financial Markets
The quantification of access to credit, i.e., determining the severity of credit
constraints, is a very important objective in the scope of MP5, as the credit constraint
in the formal market, and potentially in the informal market, can be eased by policy.
There are currently two methodologies in use for testing for the presence of
credit constraints.  The first infers the presence of credit constraints from violations of
the assumptions of the life-cycle or permanent income hypothesis, while the second
collects information directly from household surveys on whether households perceive
themselves to be constrained. 41
Measuring the Occurrence of Credit Constraints.  
Method one.  In essence, what empirical models based on permanent
income/life-cycle hypotheses do is examine whether or not current household
consumption tracks current household income. The null hypothesis is that given
regular (convex) preferences, consumption will not track income in the absence of
liquidity and borrowing constraints. Hence, counterexamples—cases that exhibit
significant tracking—are taken as evidence of liquidity and borrowing constraints.
Hall's (1978) work has been pioneering in this area. Assuming a quadratic utility
function and a constant rate of interest, Hall showed that consumption follows a
simple rule: with no borrowing constraint, given C, no other variable known at time t
t—including that about income—should help predict consumption at time t + 1, Ct+1
(Blanchard and Fischer 1989):
C = C + e ,           E(e | t)=0. t+1    t     t               t+1
Evidence to the contrary would indicate borrowing constraints.  Recently, Foster
(1995) made a methodological contribution by relating the role of credit markets in
smoothing fluctuations in the weights of young children.  He did this by using
intertemporal equilibrium conditions that related growth patterns of children to the
cost of borrowing by household.  The essence of the argument, once again, is as
follows:  better access to credit means that weight growth will depend less on current
income than in cases where borrowing constraints exist.  His findings in Bangladesh
showed that growth patterns for children in landless households were influenced by
credit market imperfections.
By its very nature, empirical testing of these types of models requires repeated
observations on the same observational unit.  Hence, most methods based on life-42
cycle theories are unusable when lengthy panel data is not available. For mainly this
reason, this approach has not been used widely in IFPRI research.
Since prudent behavior, too, can result in consumption tracking income, there is
a need to distinguish empirically between prudent behavior and behavior produced by
borrowing constraints.  This is done by Zeldes (1989).  Morduch (1990) extends this
framework to model farm households that may modify production plans in the light of
expected borrowing constraints.  Both studies, like Hall's, rely on the violation of the
first order conditions of utility maximization as a test for borrowing constraints. 
Though they represent major innovations, certain limitations nevertheless exist.  First,
if uncertainty is negatively correlated with wealth, then current income will be
negatively correlated with consumption growth, even in the absence of borrowing
constraints (Carroll 1991).  Second, as Deaton (1990) points out, the effect of negative
income shocks on consumption also depends on the initial asset position of
households.
Another problem is that the approach does not identify individual households as
being constrained, but only groups, such as landless laborers.  The most serious
objection is that it does not permit the quantification of credit constraints, i.e., it is
impossible to say how severe the constraint is, only that all households in a group are
constrained.  For these reasons, this method is not very appealing if data are available
to permit one to go beyond this approach (see the second method below).
However, while panel data (except for the Pakistan case country) test whether a
household is credit constrained in a life-cycle sense, many MP5 data sets can be used
for testing whether a household is credit constrained in the short run.  Many of the
MP5 data sets contain seasonal data on income, financial transactions, and
consumption.  The data will be used to test for the ability of households to smooth
consumption in the short run, through access to credit and other consumption43
smoothing options available to the household.  Several authors have used cross-
section data in testing for credit constraints.
Paxson (1992) offers, heretofore, an interesting approach.  First, assuming a
specific income process and a special form of the utility function (CARA), she derives
a closed-form solution for an intertemporal consumption function that has current
consumption as a function of current wealth, the "permanent income," and a third term
reflecting prudent behavior. In the absence of a long panel, she uses historical rainfall
data to decompose current income into its "transitory" and "permanent" parts. She
then examines the propensity to consume out transitory income and permanent income
for rural households in Thailand.  Testing for borrowing constraints, in this
framework, may thus be based on examining the coefficient of transitory income in
the consumption function.  If borrowing constraints were not binding, one could
expect this to be close to zero.  An alternative specification would be one that uses a
varying parameters model that makes the effect of income shocks on consumption
dependent on factors that affect financial intermediation.  Paxson's approach does not
require panel data, but repeated cross-sections of data.  
 However, while Paxson's approach can be applied to MP5 data sets, the
methodology cannot be used to identify particular households that are credit-
constrained.  It can only respond to the question whether the sample, or specific
socioeconomic groups within the sample, experienced any credit constraints.  The
results therefore cannot be used in subsequent analysis to test the impact of predicted
credit constraints on production, nutrition, and savings outcomes.  The following
method therefore attempts to directly assess the existence of credit constraints.
Method two.  The second approach uses direct information from household
surveys to decide whether a household is constrained.  This information can usually
be collected fairly easily and a (0,1) variable constructed, which takes on the value 144
      In Madagascar, Bangladesh, and Malawi, similar questions have been asked for
3
both formal and informal credit.
if someone in a household is constrained.  The usual assumption is that if even one
person is constrained, the household as a whole should be considered constrained. 
Since this approach is extremely rare in the literature (Jappelli [1990] and Feder et al.
[1990] are exceptions), it would be worthwhile to discuss the derivation of such a
variable in detail, using the IFPRI Pakistan rural household panel data set as an
illustration.  Two points to note are that in the Pakistan case, the variable was
constructed for formal credit alone, while informal credit was included in the cases of
Cameroon, Madagascar, Bangladesh, and Malawi.  The method was first applied in
the Pakistan sample, and then further developed in subsequent surveys.
In the Pakistan case, the (0,1) variable, CONST, was constructed from a
sequence of three questions in the questionnaire.  These were, "Have you
applied—over the recall period—for a loan from banks, or government or semi-
government institutions?,"  followed by, "If you applied for a loan, did you get it?,"
3
and "If you got the loan: a) was it on time; b) was the amount sufficient for you
requirements?"  The identification of discouraged borrowers begins with those who
replied in the negative to the first question.  Although respondents usually gave
several reasons for not applying, these had to be ranked in order of importance. 
Those who gave at least one of the following reasons (in any order of importance), (i)
"Could not offer the required security," or (ii) "Felt the procedure was complicated
and expensive," were classified as discouraged, provided they did not simultaneously
rank as most important one of the following, "no need for credit" or "dislike for credit
on religious grounds" (the payment of interest is against the tenets of Islam).  Anyone
else who answered no to this question was classified as unconstrained.45
Rejected borrowers were defined as those who answered no to the second
question, and rationed borrowers as those who answered no to any of the subquestions
to the third question.  Constrained households were then defined as those that fell into
any one of these three categories (i.e., discouraged, rejected, or rationed).  The process
is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2 below.  The category of discouraged
borrowers, however, may be comprised of non-applicants who could have obtained a
loan but did not bother applying for it because the expected costs for application (i.e.,
complicated and/or expensive procedure) and other loan costs (i.e., interest) were
beyond the expected benefits of the loan.  These households are therefore to be
categorized as unconstrained.  In the subsequent surveys in other countries, the
probing on the question, "Why did you not apply for credit or membership in a
particular program," was therefore expanded to better distinguish between
nonapplicants who did not apply because of cost reasons (case of lack of economic
demand for credit) and those who did not apply because of expected denial of access
for a variety of reasons, such as lack of collateral (case of constrained nonapplicants).
The next step is to see if the magnitude and severity of credit constraints can be
measured.  Following Jappelli (1990), one can proceed as follows.  A household is
constrained if the following holds:
C  - Y  - A (1+r) > S , (1) h     h      h      h
*    *4
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Figure 2—Definition of constrained households
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where
C = optimal consumption over the life cycle of household h in the h
*
absence of credit constraints,
Y = net income of household h, where labor supply and other h
*
household inputs into income generation are at their optimal levels
in the absence of credit constraints,
A = financial and nonhuman wealth, and h
S = the maximum amount that potential lenders are willing to lend to h
household h on the basis of its characteristics.
"Two factors determine whether the constraint binds: (i) how much the
individual would like to borrow, i.e., the difference between C  and available h
*
resources; and (ii) how much financial intermediaries are willing to lend to that
individual, i.e., S " (Jappelli 1990).  Without credit constraints, the optimal amount h
borrowed, B , is equal to the left side of equation (1): C -Y -A (1+r). The household
*                        *    *
 h  h h
is credit-constrained, if B  is greater than the maximum amount available from
*
lenders.
The model is made operational by assuming that
C  = XN" + ,,
 *
and
S = XN* + 0,
where X is a matrix of observable household-level variables, such as permanent
income, wealth, age, demographic characteristics, and education, plus possibly some
community-level variables.  The implication is that lenders assess the creditworthiness
of potential borrowers through the same set of variables that would be used by the
borrower himself when deciding how much to consume.  It is assumed that both C
 *48
and S are increasing in current income and wealth, i.e., that lenders will be willing to
lend more to someone whose income and wealth are higher.  It is also assumed that
Y  = ZN$ + <,
 *
where Z is a matrix of demographic variables, education, and for farm households,
land operated and farm capital as well.  Substituting these functions for C , Y , and S,
 *    *
a reduced form equation can be derived:
XN("-*) - ZN$ - A(1+r) + , - 0 - < > 0, (2)
which can be rewritten as
XN( - ZN$ - A(1+r) + µ > 0,  (2a)
where ( = ("-*), and µ = , - 0 - <.  This can be estimated as follows:
CONST = F(K + XN( - ZN$) + µ, (2b)
where
F(.) = the c.d.f of the normal distribution,
XN( - ZN$ = the reduced form for the excess demand function for
loans,
K = A(1+r) plus a constant term, and
CONST = the (0,1) dummy variable described above.49
The problem with this reduced form approach is that the variable of interest, S , the h
credit limit, is not modelled in an explicit fashion.  Jappelli assumes that the
household characteristics that influence the demand equation are the same that
influence the credit limit determined by the lender.  However, the lender's decision
will not only be influenced by household characteristics of the loan applicant, but also
by the characteristics of the informal lender (wealth, relationship with loan applicant,
etc.) and, in case of a formal lender, by the set of constraints under which the formal
sector operates (such as the program's criteria for member eligibility or loan sizing).
The technique has been applied in several IFPRI studies, notably in Madagascar
and Pakistan.  The Madagascar study differentiates between the informal and formal
sectors and uses individual household members as the units of analysis.  This model
will be discussed in the following.
The model used in the Madagascar study can be seen as a generalization of the
one described above, in that it employs two univariate probit models in which the
probability of applying for credit in each sector and the probability of obtaining the
credit are subsequently determined (Zeller 1994).  The first stage regression is a probit
regression:
Prob(APPLY) = F(I,H,E), (3)
where
APPLY = a (0,1) dummy variable, which is 1 if the individual applied
for a loan,
I = a vector of individual characteristics (age[+], sex[?],
education[+], sick days[+], being a wage laborer[+], being
the head of household[+], having social responsibility in the
community[+]),50
H = a vector of human capital variables that might be relevant to
the decision to apply (education[+], dependency ratio[?]),
and
E = a vector of events that are expected to influence credit
demand (migration or death of a family member, bad
harvest, costly social events such as marriage).
The dependent variable in the second stage is a (0,1) dummy variable, which is
1 if the household member was not rationed by formal or informal lenders,
respectively.  The second stage regression equation can be specified as follows:
Prob(SUPPMAX) = F(I,W,E,L), (4)
where
SUPPMAX = also a (0,1) dummy variable, which is one if the
household member was rationed in its loan demand,
I and E = as in (3),
W = a vector of household characteristics affecting the
lender's decision (the value of household assets owned by
an individual at the beginning of the recall period[+], the
value of liquid assets, e.g., monetary savings[+]), and
L = a vector of variables affecting the household's ability to
repay (the household's outstanding[-] debt, or the ratio of
debt to the previous year's income[-]).
The above model could be further improved by estimating it as a bivariate probit
model.  Identifying variables for the bivariate model could be the vector W, but also51
could be characteristics of the lender or the set of constraints under which the formal
sector provides loans to rural households.  In some of the MP5 countries, information
on such additional variables describing the characteristics of lenders has been
obtained.
Measuring the Extent of Credit Constraints.  Given the limitations of (0,1) variables,
it is advisable to construct variables that directly measure the extent of credit
constraints.  The credit limit for each household or individual, i.e., the maximum
amount that can be borrowed by the household or individual, is the best candidate. 
The ability of economic decisionmakers to bear risk is conditioned by the line of
credit available to them.  Data on credit limits and related variables are available for
different countries.  For Madagascar and Cameroon, data are available on the amount
demanded and amount borrowed for each transaction.  For Bangladesh and Malawi,
additional information on the credit limit is also available, i.e., respondents were
asked to estimate the maximum amount they thought they could borrow from different
sources.
The credit limit variable can be used in a regression framework.  One way to
proceed would be to explain the credit limit, A, in a reduced-form regression with
some of the variables described above:
A = F(I,W,E ,L,C),  (5) 1
where I, W, and L are as above.  The new variable, E , needs some explanation.  As 1
pointed out by Udry (1995), the pattern of repayment depends on income shocks
experienced by both the borrower and the lender, as the terms of informal loan
contracts have been found to be contingent on the state of the borrower and lender. 
Similar reasoning can hold for the credit limit that a borrower is granted by a52
particular lender.  Thus, if the lender suffers an unexpected loss of income, the
borrower is expected to repay the loan a little earlier if a loan is outstanding, or may
not be able to borrow as much as he or she had expected.  Therefore E  contains the 1
same variables as E, except that it applies to the lender and not the borrower.  The
variable C is a community-level variable that captures the idea that someone living in
a wealthy community will have a higher credit limit than someone living in a poor
community.  The estimated credit limit from the first stage can then be used as a
regressor in a second stage equation, with a measure of welfare outcomes as the
dependent variable, e.g., income.
The advantage of using the credit limit to measure access to credit is that it
increases efficiency in estimation, since more information is used.  However, care has
to be exercised in the use of this variable, since the credit limit itself cannot be
predicted with complete accuracy until potential borrowers actually apply.  Moreover,
the errors are likely to be heteroskedastic, since those households that are either at or
close to their credit limit are in a position to more accurately predict credit limits than
others.
Participation in Financial Markets
Many groups, such as small farmers, and female farmers, find themselves
unable to participate in credit markets, usually because of collateral requirements
arising from informational asymmetries in credit markets (Dasgupta 1993; Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981).  As a result, they are unable to reap the benefits of such participation
(see Eswaran and Kotwal [1989] and Dasgupta [1993] for a discussion).  Although
governments in most developing countries have tried to mitigate some of the failures
of credit markets by, for example, setting interest rate ceilings or establishing targets
for lending to particular groups, these attempts have not been uniformly successful. 
Indeed, it has been argued that they have actually undermined the objectives they53
ostensibly sought to promote (von Pischke, Adams, and Gordon 1983).  Participation
in credit markets remains problematic for large groups in developing countries.
It is often useful to have information on credit market participation in addition
to information on access.  At IFPRI, participation can be measured using data sets
from all nine MP5 countries.  One problem with part of these data sets (China, Mali,
Ghana, Nepal) is that it is not known whether those who did not participate chose to
do so voluntarily, or whether they would have liked to participate, but could not (i.e.,
whether they are discouraged borrowers).
A data set from Pakistan (the Rural Credit Survey 1985, consisting of over
2,000 households) has been used to construct two simple measures of participation in
credit markets, with the focus on small farmers, and also to measure the determinants
of participation (Malik, Broca, and Gill 1996).  This methodology is applicable to all
countries and is viewed as highly useful for intercountry comparisons.
A simple measure of participation (Measure 1) is given by the ratio of two
quantities:  (1) the proportion of the number of loans made to small farmers, which go
to a particular category (e.g., landowners); and (2) the proportion of small farm
households falling into that category.  For example, suppose that owners get 10
percent of all loans made to small farmers, while they constitute 50 percent of all
small farmers.  Then Measure 1 = 0.2 (i.e., 0.1/0.5) for small farmer owners.  It is
clear that a value of Measure 1 greater than 1 for a category implies more than equal
participation, while a value below 1 implies less than equal participation. 
Furthermore, the smaller the value of Measure 1, the more limited the participation for
that household category.
A second measure of participation (Measure 2) can also be defined, once again
as the ratio of two quantities:  (1) the value of loans made to small farmers falling into
a household category (e.g., small farmers who are owners); and (2) the value of loans
made to all owners.  For example, if an Agricultural Development Bank lends Rs 10054
to landowners in the small farmer category, out of Rs 1,000 lent to all landowners,
whether big or small farmers, the value of Measure 2 for small owners is 0.1.  Once
again, a value of Measure 2 greater than 1 indicates more than equal participation and
vice versa.
The next question is how to measure the determinants of participation.  One
approach, which has been used at IFPRI in several studies, constructs a (0,1) variable
that takes on the value 1 if a household or individual obtained any credit.  This can be
used as the dependent variable in a probit analysis to obtain the probability of
participation.  In the Pakistan study (Malik, Broca, and Gill 1996), for example, this
(0,1) variable was constructed for each household so that it took on the value 1 if
anyone in the household obtained institutional credit.  This was then regressed on
several household-level variables that determine participation, such as the ratio of
dependents to adults in the household, the size of the household's landholding, a
measure of the educational attainments of household members, ownership of a tractor,
tenancy status, as well as several community-level variables, such as the mean amount
of institutional credit obtained in the village (net of the respondent's own borrowing).
The Ghana study uses essentially the same methodology.  Two household
surveys were conducted in different regions of Ghana to evaluate the effects of
different credit programs.  A probit regression was run for credit program
participation (1 if household participated in a credit program) (Kennedy et al. 1994).
Effects on Household Incomes, Consumption, and Nutrition
In the following, various modeling approaches are reviewed.  Most of them
have been tested by members, using data sets from IFPRI, and have been critiqued by
the team members.  As noted in Chapter 3, because of differences in data, but also
because of structural differences in credit markets between countries, MP5 will
employ several methods for measuring credit impact.55
Earlier Approaches.  Earlier studies have been of two types.  They either provided a
comparative description of outcomes between borrowers versus nonborrowers
(Araujo 1967; Daines 1975; Cordova, Masicat, and Herdt 1978; Colyer and Jimenez
1971) or involved econometric analyses of the production function or the input
demand function (Becker 1970; Gyekye, Acquah, and Whyte 1977) explicitly
specifying credit use. David and Meyer (1978) raise three methodological issues
concerning these types of studies.  First, studies that attempt to measure the impact of
credit on income and welfare use the farm as the basic unit of analysis and little
attention is given to the interdependence of production and consumption activities
typical in most farm households. Second, and quite related to the first, a narrow focus
of farm analysis overlooks the fact that loans are fungible. Third, it is important to
address the attribution problem by separating the effect of loans from other factors
simultaneously affecting income and welfare. For example, if nonprice rationing of
credit resulted in concentration loans among larger and richer farmers, then difference
in outcomes between borrowers and nonborrowers may explain credit allocation
rather than impact of borrowing.
Correcting for Selectivity-Bias: The Use of Two-Stage Procedures.  The basic
problem in impact evaluation arises because of the impossibility of observing what
would happen to a household/individual in both the state it participates in the credit
program and the state that it does not (see Heckman and Smith 1995). When program
participation is not random, selection bias is likely to result if evaluation is simply
based on the difference in outcomes of participants as compared to nonparticipants.
To take Heckman and Smith’s (1995) example: "if persons elect to participate in a
program precisely because of the poor alternatives available to them outside the
program, nonparticipants will have outcomes higher than those that participants would
have if they had not participated, implying a negative selection bias" (p. 88).  The56
problem of self-selection may be handled by the use of two-stage estimated
techniques; these are described below.
For the sake of exposition, let the impact of interest be Y .  The problem arises 1
because unmeasured household-level variables affect both credit transactions, -, and
the level of outcome, Y1. With the resulting endogeneity, OLS regression of Y  on 1
credit transacted Z is likely to result in biased estimation. 
Specifically, let the two equations be specified as
A = " z  + E (6) 1 1    1 
and
Y  = "  z  + (A + E . (7) 1     2   2          2
The first equation states that A, access to a credit program, depends on a set of
household- and community-level variables represented in z . The second equation 1
states that outcome, Y , depends on another set of household and community 1
characteristics, z , and access to credit A.  The problem arises when equation (7) is 2
estimated by OLS. This is because the random error terms, E  and E , are likely to be 1    2
correlated, since unobserved household- and community-level variables affect both A
and Y .  Hence, in estimating equation (7), regressor A will be correlated with E , 1                          2
resulting in simultaneity bias. 
When the outcome variable is continuous and observable (for example,
household caloric intake, total food expenditures, anthropometric measures), a two-
stage procedure may be used to produce unbiased and consistent estimates of program
impact (Maddala 1983).  When access to a special credit program is being analyzed, A
in equation (6) may be a binary variable indicating membership of a special credit
program. The specification may be the following:57
A  " z  + E , (8)
* =
1 1    1
where A  is a continuous but latent variable describing access criterion and 
*
A = 1 if A*>0
   = 0 otherwise.
In order to remove endogeneity in the estimation of equation (7), a two-stage
estimation is proposed.  In the first stage, an estimate, ￿  of " , is obtained by probit 1     1
maximum likelihood method for equation (8).  As for equation (7), it can be rewritten
as 
Y  = "  z  + ( M M(" z )+ w, (9) 1    2   2       1  1 
where M M is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, and
w has a zero mean and is uncorrelated with the regressors (Maddala 1983).  Equation
(9) can now be estimated by OLS after substituting "  with ￿ .  Note that, unlike in 1     1
the case of the usual simultaneous equations models, equation (9) can be estimated
even if z  contains all variables in z .  This is because A is replaced by a nonlinear 2           1
function, M M(￿  z), and not a linear function, " z, as in the usual case.  However, it is 1  1               1  1
important to note that the standard errors from the second-stage regression cannot be
used to compute the t-statistic, as it ignores the fact that the regressor is itself
estimated.  The method for computing the correct covariance matrix is described in
Maddala (1983).
This simple approach can be used for data sets that do not have any information
on the credit limit available to the household.  However, the above framework does
not allow taking into account the extent to which program services are utilized, i.e.,
how much is borrowed. Hence, in case program benefits—for example, loans—are58
not uniformly distributed across member households, equations (6) and (7) may be
augmented to
- = " z  + (  A + E (10) 1 1    1       1
and
Y  = "  z  + (  - + µA + E . (11) 1     2   2     2            2
Equation (5) states that the total amount of credit borrowed by the household
(including that from nonprogram sources), -, is a function of a set of household
variables, z  and A, its access to the credit program.  The second equation states that 1
outcome Y  depends on a set of household characteristics, z , the amount of credit 1                  2
transacted, -, and A.  We include A in the impact equation because we postulate that
group membership modifies the impact of credit, which, in principle, is completely
fungible.  E  and E  represent, as before, the random error terms.  In such a case, it is 1    2
proposed that the same technique as before be used, except that equation (9) be
extended to
Y  = "  z  + ( M M("  z )+ Z  + w, 1     2   2       1   1 
 -
where Z  is obtained from a reduced form regression of Z on all exogenous variables
 -
of the system. Under this scheme, however, identification can no longer be taken for
granted.  Hence, we need to find variables that affect - but not Y .  Potential variables 1
are those that affect the supply of credit, but not demand.  Community-level variables
represent one potential set of instruments. Household-level variables reflecting the
possession of "social capital" are others.  In order to better address these identification
issues, several of the MP5 surveys (i.e., Cameroon, Madagascar, Bangladesh, and
Malawi) obtained data on the characteristics of the lender and its relationship with the59
borrower.  These lender characteristics influence the supply curve, but not the demand
curve, so that they can be used as identifiers, at least for informal credit transactions. 
For formal credit transactions, dummies or specific program characteristics
influencing the supply curve, such as criteria for loan sizing or member eligibility, can
be used as identifying variables.
Use of Quasi-Experimental Techniques.  Pitt and Khandker (1994) did not rely solely
on the nonlinear property of probit maximum likelihood estimation.  They, instead,
made use of a survey that included communities in which there were no credit
programs.  This approach allows for the comparison between a "treatment group,"
living in communities with access to a formal credit program, and a "control group,"
living in communities without such access.  Having done this, they identified the
expected value of outcome, Y , without participation from a subsample that was not 1
"contaminated" by self-selection.
IFPRI data sets do not, in general, permit the use of such an approach. One of
the major reasons for not having used an experimental approach in the IFPRI surveys
were cost considerations.  Given a limited budget, the necessarily larger sample size
of the experimental approach could only have been obtained by collecting less
information on behavioral processes and their determinants at the household level,
such as determinants of access to and participation in various programs and on
interactions between formal credit (of different types) and their numerous substitutes,
such as access to labor and land market and to informal means of smoothing
consumption. Heckman and Smith (1995) provide a critical review of the
experimental approach:  it can, in principle, eliminate the selection bias, but does not
give, except for special cases, information on the distributional consequences of the
program impact on participants and nonparticipants.  Furthermore, the possibility of
substitution bias is eminent in studying the impact of a particular credit program on60
household-level outcomes.  Substitution bias arises when members of an experimental
control group (those living in a village without the particular credit program in
question) gain access to close substitutes of the services provided by the program in
question. For example, in studying the impact of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, close
substitutes could be the numerous other nongovernmental credit programs that target
the landless.  If substitution bias is introduced through inappropriate randomization of
villages having access to close substitutes to the program, the estimated impact on the
program can be biased.
However, there is a related issue of sample-selection bias that will have to be
addressed in those country-case studies where a stratified random sampling procedure,
in which the stratifying variable was participation in a credit program, was used.
Since, in most cases, participation is a choice made by individual members, the
sampling procedure falls into the category of endogenous (or choice-based) stratified
sampling.  As a consequence, standard estimation methods that assume random
sampling or exogenous stratified sampling yield inconsistent parameter estimates if
applied in this context (Cosslett 1981; Manski and McFadden 1981; Hausman and
Wise 1981; Amemiya 1985; Pitt and Khandker 1994).
Several estimators that are consistent under endogenous stratified sampling have
been proposed (see Manski and McFadden (1981) and Amemiya (1985) for review
and derivation of their asymptotic properties).  They are all maximum likelihood
estimators (MLE), except Hausman and Wise (1981).  Weighted Least Squares is a
feasible option only when the population proportions of the endogenous strata are
known or can at least be consistently estimated from another random sample. 
Knowledge of the population proportions of the strata is also required by some of the
simpler maximum likelihood estimators.61
Use of Panel Data.  Yet another method to deal with selection bias is to make use of
panel data for households before and after program initiation. In case this is available,
unobserved household characteristics could be swept out, using fixed effects. 
However, panel data are costly to collect and are available at IFPRI only in the case of
Pakistan.  An additional consideration is that precision of estimates depends on the
length of the panel. A very short panel will produce imprecise estimates.
Separability Between Production and Consumption: The Use of Switching
Regressions.  Feder et al. (1990) suggested that production functions of constrained
households should differ from those of unconstrained households, since production
and consumption decisions are inseparable for households that are constrained.  Feder
et al. make the following assumptions:
! All farm households are unconstrained in all markets except the credit
market.
! Some households are also constrained in the credit market.  For these
households, production decisions are influenced by household
characteristics.
! Therefore, in estimating production functions, household characteristics
should be included for constrained households and should be left out for
unconstrained households.
The estimation technique used is switching regressions.  Step one is to estimate
a variable that determines whether or not a household is credit constrained.  In the
second step, the estimated value of this variable is used to deciding which of the two
regimes (constrained or unconstrained) applies in the second-stage regressions. 
Depending on whether the predicted value is 1 (constrained) or 0 (unconstrained), the62
production equation includes total liquidity and demographic structure as regressors
for constrained households in addition to land, capital, education, and farm
experience, which are common to all households.
The expectation is that the coefficient of total liquidity is positive and
significant in the production function equation for constrained households, but the
coefficients of the demographic variables are not.  In addition, a "counterfactual" case
can be estimated in which the version with total liquidity and demographic variables
is run on the subsample of unconstrained households.  The hypothesis is that these
variables will be insignificant in this equation.
Experience with this model at IFPRI has not been very encouraging.  The model
was applied to the Madagascar data set, 180 households tracked over three rounds in
1991-1992.  Three major problems with the switching regressions model were
encountered.  First, it does not yield results that conform to expectations.  The
simplest reason for this is probably that households are constrained in the labor
market as well as in the credit market.  This assumption was tested by including labor
market variables as well in the equations for the unconstrained households.  Yet,
demographic variables like adult equivalent family size continued to be significant for
unconstrained households.  Second, the model is highly sensitive to specification. 
Adding or dropping variables produces dramatic changes in both sign and significance
for key variables.  Finally, it is difficult to assess significance, both because t-tests are
not really appropriate and also because there are so many predicted variables being
used as regressors (to reduce simultaneity bias) that conventional tests of significance
(e.g., likelihood ratio tests) are hard to interpret.
System Approach
The demand for the various financial commodities are affected not only by their
own cost and supply attributes (interest rate, transaction costs, and supply constraints),63
but also by the prices of the other food and nonfood commodities as well of illiquid
assets.  For example, a rise in the price of a food staple may induce a household to
borrow (or be ready to accept a reciprocal gift) in order to meet its food consumption
requirement.  Likewise, the cost-related attributes of the financial commodities affect
the demand for the food and nonfood commodities, and illiquid assets.  For example,
the rise in the interest rate or the binding of the credit constraint for one financial
commodity may lead a liquidity-constrained household to reduce its consumption for
some food or nonfood commodities.  The econometric implication is that one needs to
estimate a system of demand/supply equations constituted by the demands and supply
for the main types of financial commodities (formal and informal loans received,
informal loans given, savings, and gifts given and received), food commodities,
nonfood commodities, and other household outcomes of interest (nutritional and
health status, for example).
With this system approach, and the implied theoretical restrictions (symmetry,
homogeneity, etc.), which can be explicitly derived after setting up the optimization
problem with all the constraints facing the household, one can calculate the various
own and cross elasticities of substitution (both compensated and uncompensated) not
only for the financial commodities, but also cross elasticities between financial
commodities and other commodities (food and nonfood commodities).  For example,
this allows for evaluation, in a consistent way, of the percentage changes in the
demand and supply for an informal loan, and savings, and in the demand for food,
when the interest rate or the maximum loan amount in the formal sector is increased
by, say, 1 percent.  More importantly, the system approach, by incorporating the
substitution and income effects that are likely to result from any change in the credit
market, allows for an estimate of the true welfare impact of any improved access to
formal credit. 64
Derivation of the System of Demand and Supply Equations.  What follows is a brief
outline of our methodology.
To derive such a system of household demand/supply for loans (formal and
informal), savings, gifts, and food and nonfood commodities described above, there
are basically two alternative approaches:
! The first approach is the direct econometric, reduced-form estimation
approach.  This approach is relatively straightforward and does not
require a prior mathematical model.  Indeed, one needs only to specify the
demand for each commodity in the system as a function of the whole
vector of "exogenous variables" (which would include interest rates—if
their sampling variations are sufficient, the maximum amount that the
household could borrow for each type and recorded loan transaction,
prices, etc.), and then estimate the system jointly, using a variant of S.U.R
(Seemingly Unrelated Regressions).  Although this method is the common
approach in the empirical literature dealing with saving and credit issues,
it has two main disadvantages.  First, with this direct approach, it is not, in
general, possible to invoke and/or impose the theoretical restrictions that
would be implied by the corresponding structural model.  Second, the
estimated system may not be integrable (i.e., it may not represent a true
demand/supply system for a utility maximizing individual) and thus
cannot generate valid indicators of true welfare impact for any considered
change in "exogenous" variables.  Even if the system is integrable, it may
be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the true welfare indicators
(feasible only through very simple functional forms or numerical
analysis).
! The alternative approach we prefer and plan to follow is the "duality"
approach, consisting of the following steps:65
• Start with a mathematical utility maximization model (in a
intertemporal choice under uncertainty context) that explicitly
formulates the credit constraints facing the household (in both the
formal and informal sectors), along with the intertemporal budget
constraint, the liquidity constraints linking the various sources of
household income, and the imperfect substitutability of the financial
commodities relation or constraint.
• Work out the theoretical and mathematical justifications that allow
the derivations of analogues of Roy's identity, Shephard's dilemma,
and the Slutsky equation.
• Derive the functional relationships between demands/supplies and
the indirect utility functional (or the equivalent of an expenditure
functional via duality).  These functional relationships will be the
analogues of Roy's identity and Shephard's Lemma in Standard
demand theory.
• Postulate an explicit "flexible" and integrable functional form for
the indirect utility functional (or the analogue of the expenditure
function via duality).
• Use the functional relationships discussed above to derive the
explicit functional form of the system of demand/supply functions
to be estimated, indicators of true welfare impact, and the implied
theoretical restrictions that could be imposed during the
econometric estimation.
The methodology outlined above is fully worked out and empirically
implemented in Diagne (1994) in a static context of price uncertainty.  We note that
under uncertainty, both the demand for credit and the credit limit are random
variables, the outcomes of which depend on the realized state of nature.  Indeed, loan66
decisions are not instantaneous decisions made on the spot; rather, they are merely
parts of the implementation of a well-thought optimal contingency plan (i.e., sequence
of decisions that are taken over time, conditional on the occurrence of specific
events).  Similarly, the maximum amount one can borrow from a particular source of
credit is likely to depend on the occurrence of some particular events that could
positively or adversely affect potential lenders and other borrowers (drought, for
example).  Hence, formally, the credit constraint is a stochastic constraint that requires
the resolution of some mathematical technicalities before an optimal solution can be
proved to exist and characterized.  However, the results in Diagne (1994) are general
enough to handle this case.
Some Econometric Estimation Issues.  From either one of the two approaches outlined
above, one will arrive on a system of equations having, on the left-hand side, the
amounts of credits demanded by individual household members from each sector
(formal and informal), the amounts of informal credits supplied individual household
members, the amounts of cash saved, the amount of gifts given and received, and the
quantities demanded for the food and nonfood commodities. The right-hand side will
contain observed household demographic variables, prices of food and nonfood
commodities, prices of inputs and outputs of product, the interest rates in the formal
and informal sector (including or excluding the observed transaction costs), and the
maximum credit limit variables for both informal and formal loans.
More formally, the system of equations to be estimated will more or less have
the following form:
y = f($,r,r,l ,r ,p,z), i f i f
m m
with y / (l ,l ,l ,s,g ,g ,c ,o), i f i
d d g g r d67
where
l  (resp l ) = the amount of informal (resp formal) credit obtained, i     f
d    d
l = the amount of informal credit given out by individuals, i
g
s = the amount of cash saved,
g  (resp g ) = is the value of gifts given (resp received),
g     r
c = a vector of quantities for the food and nonfood
commodities (and of input and output products), and
o = a vector of other choice or outcome variables of interest.
On the right side,
$ = the vector of parameters to be estimated,
r (resp r) = the interest rate in the informal (resp formal) credit i    f
market,
l  (resp l ) = the maximum credit limit in the informal (resp formal) i      f
m    m
credit market,
p = a vector of prices for food and nonfood commodities
(and of input and output prices),
z = the vector of household and individual characteristics,
and
, = an error term.
There are three important estimation issues that need to be dealt with in order to
get consistent estimates of the parameters in the system: the problem of simultaneity
bias due to the presence of the maximum credit limit variable as an explanatory
variable, the pronounced nonlinearity for the demand of credit, and the problem of
sample selection bias.68
Simultaneity.  The simultaneity of the maximum credit limit variable results not
only from the obvious fact that it is likely to be correlated with unobservable
household characteristics absorbed into the error term, but also because it is
influenced by other observable (past) choices made by the borrower.  This is
especially true in the informal market, where one of the motivations for individuals to
give loans and gifts to others is to preserve or increase its future ability to borrow.  At
present, the standard way to deal with this simultaneity is to use instruments. 
However, finding valid instruments for the maximum credit limit appears to be
difficult, as most of the obvious candidates for instruments (household assets, income,
and the like) are likely to be correlated with the same unobserved individual
characteristics.
Nonlinearity.  The type of nonlinearity we are talking about here is the one
induced by the fact that for many individuals, zero is the optimal loan demand (either
by choice or by constraint—zero maximum credit limit).  A standard and now popular
way to deal with this problem is to use limited dependent (Tobit) methods of
estimation.  However, standard full parametric Tobit estimation relies crucially on the
distributional assumption of normality, and, in practice, this seems to yield parameter
estimates that are very sensitive to minor changes in specification (inclusion or
exclusion of explanatory variables).  This is a robustness issue that has been addressed
in recent literatures by the use of a semi-parametric estimation method (i.e., use of
distribution free estimators), which tends to be computationally involved.  An
alternative way of dealing with the pronounced nonlinearity is to rely on a
"parsimonious" nonlinear functional form and use Least Squares methods.
Sample selection bias.  The sample selection bias we are talking about here is
the one associated with the endogenous stratified sampling procedure used for our
survey.  This has already been discussed above.69
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